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Learning and knowing as semiosis: 
Extending the conceptual apparatus 
of semiotics
Cary Campbell1, Alin Olteanu2, Kalevi Kull3
Abstract. If all knowing comes from semiosis, more concepts should be added 
to the semiotic toolbox. However, semiotic concepts must be defined via other 
semiotic concepts. We observe an opportunity to advance the state-of-the-art in 
semiotics by defining concepts of cognitive processes and phenomena via semiotic 
terms. In particular, we focus on concepts of relevance for theory of knowledge, 
such as learning, knowing, affordance, scaffolding, resources, competence, me-
mory, and a few others. For these, we provide preliminary definitions from a 
semiotic perspective, which also explicates their interrelatedness. Redefining these 
terms this way helps to avoid both physicalism and psychologism, showcasing the 
epistemological dimensions of environmental situatedness through the semiotic 
understanding of organisms’ fittedness with their environments. Following our 
review and presentation of each concept, we briefly discuss the significance of our 
embedded redefinitions in contributing to a semiotic theory of knowing that has 
relevance to both the humanities and the life sciences, while not forgetting their 
relevance to education and psychology, but also social semiotic and multimodality 
studies.
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The theoretical strength and useful applicability of semiotics is largely dependent 
on the adequacy and richness of its conceptual apparatus. The greater part of the 
semiotic toolbox comes from a few classic authors, with considerable enrichment 
and diversification occurring between the 1960s and 1980s. The decades after that 
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have not added many new concepts. Mostly, this recent period is characterized 
by its focus on discussions about the areas of applicability of existing concepts 
and about the relationships (complementarity, or incompatibility, or fittedness, 
or synthesis, etc.) between the conceptual systems of different semiotic schools. 
Some conceptual (and terminological) changes are seemingly irreversible: for 
instance, the earlier opposition between signs and symbols in some approaches 
has led to the acceptance of symbols as subtypes of signs; after the initial opposi-
tion between Saussurean and Peircean semiotics, attempts have been made to 
accommodate both, making a natural space for Saussurean semiotics in a wider 
theory, at the same time avoiding the pansemiotic approach (e.g. Stables 2012; 
Favareau, Kull 2015); interpretation and meaning-making are understood as 
universal features of semiosis; semiosis is identified as taking place in a wide range 
of living systems. The latter aspect has opened the area for the development of 
biosemiotics (together with the important border area of cognitive semiotics), 
which became in this way a field of discussions on general semiotics. 
Our thesis is that semiosis as the fundamental process of meaning-making 
implies, as its central aspects, learning, memory, and knowing; and that semiosic 
activity assumes and is framed by resources, competence, affordances, and 
scaffolding. All these listed concepts describe components or aspects of semiosis; 
therefore, they can be incorporated within contemporary semiotics. For this, 
however, these concepts should be understood through intra-semiotic lenses. 
We understand a concept to belong to the semiotic toolbox (i.e., to be a semiotic 
concept) if it is defined via other concepts of semiotics. Thus, our task is to 
redefine these mentioned concepts accordingly, within a semiotic framework.
The authors of this article met for some seminars in Tartu in the spring of 
2019, and divided the work in the following way: Cary Campbell led the study on 
affordances and scaffolding, Alin Olteanu on resources and competence, Kalevi 
Kull added the introduction, and we together connected it into a study on the 
semiotics of learning and knowing.
1. Learning, knowing, and other aspects of cognition – 
extending the list of basic semiotic concepts
While, according to an old formula, life and cognition are coextensive (e.g., 
Heschl 1990), it is also rather natural to accept that cognition and semiosis are 
coextensive.4 Therefore, it is necessary to explicate the relationships of all the 
4 See also Zlatev 2003.
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above-mentioned cognitive concepts to the concept of semiosis. Semio tic defini-
tions for the concepts of cognitive processes are necessary for a comprehen sive 
general semiotic theory. The recent attention that semiotic research is paying to 
aspects of cognition (Eco 1999; Zlatev, Sonesson, Konderak 2016; Konderak 2018; 
Mittelberg 2019; Brandt 2020) demonstrates this need.5 
To establish the whole network of cognitive semiotic concepts is beyond our 
current task. Our aim here is (1) to argue for the importance of importing a 
row of concepts into the basic semiotic theory, and (2) to sketch some of these 
relationships. 
A look into semiotic dictionaries clearly suggests the necessity of such an 
integrating effort. As shown in Table 1, the terms describing learning and cogni-
tion are mostly absent in the classic semiotic terminology.
Thus, in this paper, we sketch the relations between some elements of the 
general semiotic account of learning. Within our model, these elements include 
the embedded and interrelated concepts of resource, competence, affordance, and 
scaffolding. We explore these notions as connected to the seemingly more primary 
biosemiotic concepts of umwelt and learning. 
We consider that the future development of semiotic theory will rely on these 
terms  – often plagued with hidden homunculi and psychologism  – redefined 
in general semiotic terms; i.e. without reducing them to mentalistic schemas or 
production rules, but rather, as sign-relations, descriptions of the ways in which 
organisms live, interact and co-evolve with their environment. 
Each of these concepts (take, as a clear example, ‘learning’) is used in in con-
sistent variations through different discourses. Therefore, as part of our metho-
dology, we will present each concept individually, carefully tracing (a) the term’s 
common meaning and introduction; (b) its historical development and use in 
different disciplines, including semiotics; and (c) redefinition of the term within a 
general semiotic theory of knowledge. Following our presentation of each concept, 
we briefly discuss the significance of our embedded redefinitions, in contributing 
to a semiotic theory of knowing that has relevance to both the humanities and the 
life sciences, while not forgetting their relevance to education and psychology, but 
also social semiotic and multimodality studies.
5 Th e biosemiotic glossary project has partly a similar aim, to enrich the conceptual system 
of general semiotics (see Favareau, Gare 2017; Rodrí guez Higuera, Kull 2017; Tønnessen 2015; 
Tønnessen, Magnus, Brentari 2015). Also, see the volume Concepts for Semiotics (Rodríguez 
Higuera, Bennett 2016).
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Table 1. Inclusion of some cognitive semiotic terms in some dictionaries of semiotics (– no 
such entry; + corresponding entry exists). 
Dictionary
Entries
Colapietro 
1993
Bouissac 1998 Martin, 
Ringham 
2006
Sebeok, 
Danesi 2010
Cobley 
2010
aff ordance – + – – –
competence + – + competence/ 
performance
+
fi tting – – – – –
knowing – knowledge 
representation; 
cultural knowledge
knowing-
how-to-do
– –
learning – – – – –
memory – – – – –
modelling – – – modeling 
system
+
representation + – – – –
resources – – – – –
scaff olding – – – – –
umwelt + + – /under 
Uexküll
+
2. Semiotic learning, memory
Learning is a significant concept within a range of disciplines; not only those 
concerned with organic forms of learning (psychology, educational studies, 
anthropology, biology) but also technology-related fields (such as the study of 
artificial intelligence, and computer sciences) through the related notions of 
machine and computational learning. 
A starting-point definition states that learning is the acquiring or modification 
of sign relations, which is manifest in a change of behaviour (see Stables 2005, 
2006). 
Recently, the concept of semiotic learning has become a significant cornerstone 
in biosemiotic, but also educational semiotic research. In these discourses, 
learning is linked with the growth of significance within a species-specific pheno-
menal world, or umwelt. Andrew Stables laid out the foundation for a semiotic 
educational philosophy and theory starting from the observation that “if all living 
is semiotic engagement, then learning is semiotic engagement” (Stables 2006: 
375). This broad  – and hermeneutically permissive  – concept of learning has 
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stimulated much semiotic inquiry on education recently (see Stables et al. 2018; 
Olteanu, Stables 2018; Campbell 2017; Olteanu, Campbell 2018). 
Paul Bouissac, speaking about semiotics as the science of memory, has ob-
served: “Considering that semiotics takes as its main object of inquiry systems 
of signs that are learned (languages, cultural codes, social discourse, etc.), it is 
surprising that so few semioticians so far have shown a marked interest in 
the science of memory” (Bouissac 2007: 76, emphasis added). Accordingly, 
together with the concept of learning, the concept of memory should also have 
a fundamentally semiotic definition. For instance: memory is the semiotic 
scaffolding established by learning. From this understanding, as we observe, 
“memory is not limited to the body of an organism. Traces in the surrounding, 
constructed niche, can be a part of memory” (Kull 2018: 458).
3. Knowing, knowledge
This overlap between the semiotic theory of education and the semiotic theory of 
biology reveals one of the most interesting features of semiotics in general: its implied 
theory of knowledge. Signs, as basic semiotic units, are not units of measurement, 
but rather refer to meaningful relationships that sustain, enable and constrain the 
organism’s interactions – thus, they are ultimately qualitative and subject to dynamic 
change and growth. Notably, semiotic relations refer to an important type of “second 
order causality”, that causes changes in the causal action itself, through altering the 
ways in which organisms re-channel energy (see Pearson 2018: 399–400; Campbell 
2018: Section 5). Following trends in ecosemiotics and biosemiotics, it is possible 
to consider that semiotics itself is increasingly becoming a theory of knowledge, 
as it describes the diversity of models and modelling phenomena across different 
organisms’ umwelten, and thus the “forms of knowledge” (Sebeok, Danesi 2000) 
expressed by life’s diverse interactions. The interactions of living systems create new 
forms (scaffoldings and resources) for meaning-making. These basic biological 
forms (scaffolding structures) appear to be signs (or sign-vehicles) that organisms 
endow with meaning through coming to know them in their own species-specific 
ways. In this way, “biology accounts for a spectrum of meanings that a form affords 
within the horizon of an organism’s competences for meaning-making” (Olteanu, 
Stables 2018: 411, emphasis added).
Defining semiotics as a theory of knowledge, of course, has a longer tradition. 
Tzvetan Todorov stated: “We are treating semiotics as a discourse whose objective 
is knowledge (rather than poetic beauty or pure speculation), and whose subject 
matter is the whole variety of sign phenomena (not only for example words)” 
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(Todorov 1978: 1, emphasis added). This same idea is also referred to by Walker 
Percy (1957, “Semiotic and theory of knowledge”), Sandra Moriarty (2002: 25, 
“Peircean semiotics is a theory of knowing”), etc.
A principal and common feature of semiotic theories consists in their con-
ceptua lization of knowledge as interpretative. Both Charles Peirce’s semiotics and the 
(post)structuralist tradition, inspired mostly by Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology, 
claim that knowing supposes interpreting. Semiotic theories, many of which can be 
conflicting in several regards, imply a hermeneutic epistemology (cf. Hoffmeyer 2018; 
Feil, Olteanu 2018). Also, meaning is to a large extent functional, as the pragmatic 
maxim states: meaning is in reference to some purpose, no matter how changing 
and dynamic such purposes may appear to be (CP 5.3 [1902]). In what regards 
behaviour, this semiotic view is complementary to, but also more encompassing 
than, that of cognitive dissonance theory in psychology (Festinger 1957). 
We argue that a general semiotic theory of knowing can bridge logic and 
psychology while avoiding the pitfalls of subduing one to the other (e.g., Stjernfelt 
2014). Cognition does not fit the narrow principles of formal, propositional logic; 
nor is logic necessarily psychological. Rather, a biosemiotic perspective asserts 
that phenomena like cognition, perception, and even consciousness, assume some 
primary semiosic operations that sustain these higher-level pro cesses. Semiosis is 
a universal of cognition, expressed in the actions of any meaning-seeking system. 
The category of meaning, as foundational to semiotics, offers a perspective from 
which to understand learning outside of psychologic reductions, which mostly 
conceive of learning as the expression of achieved mental states or behavioural 
outcomes, ultimately occurring within the brain of the subject. From a semiotic 
account, meaning implies a relationship; this includes a mediating element that 
emerges through the pairedness of an organism’s inside and outside (see Nöth 
1998: 339). Thus, a semiotic theory of learning must ulti mately be ecologically 
construed (Olteanu, Stables 2018; Campbell 2018, 2019), emphasizing the 
active abilities of organisms to reshape their environments through using and 
discovering sign-relations. 
From a semiotic point of view, knowledge can be defined as everything 
meaning ful. However, together with Jesper Hoffmeyer we add that “knowledge 
is not something we have but something created [evoked] in the very moment of 
use” (Hoffmeyer 2018: 1). Truthfulness is not a necessary condition for knowledge. 
According to a semiotic model, meaning assumes mediatedness. Consequently, 
what may seem as direct knowledge (e.g. in the sense of Ingold 2019), in a closer 
analysis is revealed to include mediation. Mediatedness is a characteristic feature 
that distinguishes knowing from processes that do not include knowing (as 
occurring among non-living entities). 
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4. Semiotic resources
From a semiotic perspective, resources and competences are complementary and 
inseparable concepts. A semiotic resource is something that can be used to represent; 
that can be engaged with semiotically and, as such, leads to the genera tion (or 
discovery) of (more) meaning. The concept of resources has roots in the Greimasian 
tradition of semiotics and is associated with the related notion of performances (cf. 
Pikkarainen 2018: 443) as the enacting of new active behaviour. The concept has 
mostly been investigated in social semiotics, in relation to the concept of modality 
that is used in communication and education (Kress, Leeuwen 2001; Kress 2003, 
2010), and its applicability should be rather universal (Fei 2004). Semiotic resources, 
Kress considered, depend upon “the context of the choice of modes made” (Kress 
2003: 8) within a new performance. The basic concept of semiotic resource supposes 
choice. Kress explained that because conveying something implies a representation 
of what is conveyed, the choices made in designing the representation are inherent 
in what is conveyed. The same holds true for learning: the way in which the learner 
perceives what is apprehended, its modalities of expression, is an inherent part of 
the apprehension. Knowledge, this is to say, is a matter of design. The idea behind 
Kress’ construal of resource as a matter of modal choices is also expressed, in a 
biosemiotic concern, in Hoffmeyer’s explanation that information is meaningful 
only by its framing in a medial context (Hoffmeyer 2018: 5). 
The social semiotic approach, however, tends to ignore the role of the body in 
knowledge and communication. Semiotic resources are here deemed as anything 
“available in a culture” (Kress, Leeuwen 2001: 4) that can be used for meaning-
making. We extrapolate and expand this notion of semiotic resource to encompass 
not only resources for meaning-making within a culture, but available in the en-
vironment, in general. The need for an embodied account of meaning is evident not 
only in a biosemiotic concern. For instance, Elleström (2018: 270–271; 2019: 10) 
argues that mediality, as the intermediate stage of communication, is not evoked 
only by culture or technology but, to begin with, by an organism’s body. Besides the 
need for an embodied perspective on meaning (and knowledge), this also avoids 
the cultural atomism and exaggerated relativism implied, on some accounts, in 
social semiotics (e.g., Kress 2010: 19) by anchoring learning in specific linguistic 
and cultural modes (see Cobley 2016; Olteanu 2019). As we explain in more 
detail below, this comprehensive notion of semiotic resource connects with that of 
affordance, as coined by Gibson (e.g., 1979). The relation, mostly morphological, 
between body and landscape affords certain resources. Thus, semiotic resources are 
not merely anything present in the environment, but anything that an organism’s 
sense perceptive and motoric capabilities evoke as available.
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Semiotic resources are subjective, depending on (1) what the organism, given 
its embodied morphology and its relation to the environment, can use and (2) 
what the organism chooses to use. For instance, a tree can be used for nesting by a 
bird and as source of food for a monkey. However, the monkey could additionally 
come to choose to use the tree as shelter. A human might choose, also, to use the 
same tree as fuel. All these uses are based on (almost) the same “hard” physical 
matter, but they rely on different resources, conceived semiotically.
5. Semiotic competences
According to Stjernfelt (2006), the (post)structuralist tradition of semiotics 
tends to regard the body as yet another cultural concept, represented in cultural-
dependent modalities, being conceived “as subjected to the free arbitrariness 
of semiotic systems – and no special attention would be paid to the body as a 
crucial prerequisite of semiotic articulation” (Stjernfelt 2006: 14). This mentalistic 
view dissociates what evokes learning from what limits it, as “no extrastructural 
constraints are supposed to determine the spectrum of possibilities of body 
representation” (Stjernfelt 2006: 14). In view of the various pathways that 
contribute to biosemiotic theory, such as Jakob von Uexküll’s (1982[1940]) 
theoretical biology, cognitive semantics (Lakoff, Johnson 1999; Fauconnier, Turner 
2002), Merleau-Ponty’s (1995) phenomenology of the body, and complexity theory 
(Kauffman 2000), Stjernfelt sets the direction for developing a body concept that 
“makes evident the basic semiotic competences of an organism, i.e., a body concept 
which entails semiotics” (Stjernfelt 2006: 14, emphasis added).
With this claim, Stjernfelt also places the notion of semiotic competence in 
the new light of embodiment theory. In contradiction to the dualist view of the 
body as the external shell of an intelligent mind, where the latter is responsible for 
knowledge, the body itself is conceived as epistemological. Thus, the body is not 
defined as a brute physical form, constituted merely by joint limbs and component 
parts, but in relation to the competences for meaning making that this biological 
form entails. 
From this perspective, we define semiotic competence as the capability of an 
organism, dependent on its embodied morphology, to discover meaning resources 
in a given environment and to recombine them in new, pragmatically functional 
models. As such, semiotic competences are employed to scaffold knowledge, which 
is to say, to develop models of (aspects of) their environment, which result in a 
capacity to navigate in the environment. A scaffolding is similar to what it aims 
to grasp, being deemed a model, because, following this metaphor for learning, 
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it moulds onto it.6 The erection of new scaffoldings, thus, leads to environmental 
changes that evoke new semiotic resources. In the scaffolding process, not only 
organisms change  – their environments change, too. Thus, as new semiotic 
resources become available and are used, organisms and environments co-develop. 
This notion of semiotic competence critically differs from the traditional 
conception as merely a more encompassing version of the concept of literary 
competence (see Culler 1980: 109–110), stemming from Chomskyan linguistics 
and, further down the line, from Saussure’s semiology. Rooted in linguistics, these 
accounts of competence are precisely the target of Stjernfelt’s (2006) criticism, as they 
imply a view of the body as entirely subjected to cultural and linguistic arbitrariness 
and, thus, not responsible for knowledge (see also Olteanu, Stables 2018: 425).7 
6. Affordances: an evolving concept
6.1. Gibson’s conception
The American psychologist James Gibson coined the concept of ‘affordances’ 
through his project of developing an “ecological approach” to the study of visual 
perception. Gibson marked this a theory of direct perception, in distinction to 
theories that assert that perception is mediated (i.e., through mental represen-
tations, models, cognitive schemas, etc.).8 
6 See René Th om’s and Th omas A. Sebeok’s view of competence, as discussed in the context 
of iconic learning and educational semiotics, in Campbell (2019: 300–304).
7 A related notion of competences (also linguistically derived and expressed) has signifi cantly 
entered curriculum discourse and policy in the last two decades (see, for example, Ruitenberg 
2019). In these discourses, competences basically refer to pre-determined benchmarks for 
educational success that learners and teachers are expected to “perform” (see Stables 2019: 
27–30, for this “problem of performativity” in education). As Biesta and Priestley observed 
in their classic article “Capacities and the curriculum”: “what is signifi cant here is that [...] the 
student shift s from being the subject in education – that is the one who is supposed to study, 
learn, master, acquire, evaluate, judge, etcetera – to become the outcome of education” (Biesta, 
Priestley 2013: 36). It is hypothesized that an embodied and ecological, meaning-based notion 
of competences (as presented in this study) may open new avenues for philosophically refi ning 
“competency-talk” in educational research and curriculum design. 
8 Chemero (2006: 59–60, emphasis added) describes the three main tenets of Gibsonian 
direct perception cogently: “First, perception is direct, which is to say that it does not involve 
computation or mental representations. Th at is, Gibson thought that perception was not a 
matter of internally adding information to sensations. Second, perception is primarily 
for the guidance of action, and not for action-neutral information gathering. We perceive 
the environment in order to do things. Th e third tenet follows from the fi rst two. Because 
perception does not involve mental addition of information to stimuli, yet is able to guide 
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Over the course of his career, Gibson increasingly found classic empirical 
psychology generally inadequate for understanding the complexities of percep-
tion, as it did not account for an actor’s actual engagement and immersion in their 
environment: “[...] orthodox psychology asserts that we perceive [...] objects insofar 
as we discriminate their properties or qualities” (Gibson 1979: 134). Instead, he 
proposed “that what we perceive when we look at objects are their affordances, not 
their qualities” (Gibson 1979: 134, emphasis added). Thus, he introduced the novel 
term “affordance” that implies an ecological dimension for learning: 
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides 
or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, 
but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that 
refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. 
It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment. (Gibson 1979: 
127, emphasis in original)
This concept was in many ways Gibson’s last main contribution to the theory 
of visual psychology that he had been developing since the publication of his 
first book The Perception of the Visual World (1950) and culminating in the 
posthumous, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1979), where the 
notion of ‘affordances’ is presented and developed. Gibson believed that visual 
psychology could no longer proceed from the dualistic basis of a “depersonalilzed” 
operational environment, conceptualized as distinct from the organism’s cognized 
environment (see D’Aquili et al. 1979 for the distinction). Although it is possible to 
model aspects of the environment through a physicalist lens, Gibson stressed that 
“this is not to say that it [an organism] perceives the world of physics and behaves 
in the space and time of physics” (Gibson 1979: 8). On account of this non-dualist 
and phenomenal approach we consider that Gibson’s affordance theory can be 
insightfully coopted in the scope of (bio)semiotics.
When considering how the environment affords possibilities for action and 
response, the organism’s embodied, species-specific phenomenal world (umwelt)
is of central importance.9 Gibson stressed that the organism must always be 
considered in terms of its embeddedness within an eco-system; as even its sense 
organs and perceptual systems evolved in intimate connection to a local and 
behavior adaptively, all the information necessary for guiding adaptive behavior must be 
available in the environment to be perceived.” See also Michaels, Carello (1981: 2) and Fodor, 
Pylyshyn (1981) for more on the importance of this distinction for psychology.
9 “[Th e physical properties that constitute aff ordances] have unity relative to the posture 
and behaviour of the animal being considered. So, an aff ordance cannot be measured as we 
measure in physics” (Gibson 1979: 127–128).
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dynamic environment (cf. Gibson 1966). In a semiotic manner, the organism’s 
embeddedness within an ecosystem can be regarded as long processes of 
scaffolding, which, in most cases, started long before the organism’s individual 
birth and is continued by the individual organism’s environmental modelling, in 
ways critical for its own existence. This idea of embeddedness led Gibson to an 
important reimagining of the concept ‘niche’ as “a set of affordances” (Gibson 
1979: 128).10
6.2. Limits of Gibson’s concept
As the above passages indicate, central to Gibson’s conception is that affordances 
are not solely in the environment or the organism, but rather, cut across the 
subjective-objective barrier. Nevertheless, it is precisely this complementarity that 
has given rise to ambiguity in Gibson’s own use of the term and has resulted in the 
concept being frequently critiqued and reformulated (cf. Shotter 1983; Stoffregen 
2000; Scaratino 2003; Costall 2012; Dotov et al. 2012; Barsingerhorn et al. 2012: 
55). For exampl e, Gibson often seemed to suggest that affordances are fully on 
the side of the environment, and thus more (ontologically) “real” than purely 
meaning-based (semiotic) relations.11 
By not focusing on the ontological status of affordances, and dealing mainly with 
the perception of ambient light, Gibson could sidestep the complicated problems 
around how an actor’s experience (personal and cultural) impacts upon the 
perception of affordances. Gibson stated this explicitly: “The central question for the 
theory of affordances is not whether they exist and are real but whether information 
is available in ambient light for perceiving them” (Gibson 1979: 140). The result: the 
awkward line that Gibson is forced to walk because of this evasion, is empirically 
vague and philosophically muddled. We aim to invest the concepts of ‘niche’ and 
‘affordance’ as inspired from Gibson, in sharper focus by nesting them in a semiotic 
framework, where body and environment are revealed as co-developing.
10 “A species of animal is said to utilize or occupy a certain niche in the environment. Th is 
is not quite the same as the habitat of the species; a niche refers more to how an animal lives 
than to where it lives. I suggest that a niche is a set of aff ordances [...]. Th e natural environment 
off ers many ways of life, and diff erent animals have diff erent ways of life. Th e niche implies a 
kind of animal, and the animal implies a kind of niche. Note the complementarity of the two” 
(Gibson 1979: 128). Cf. the concept of semiotic niche in Hoff meyer (2008: Ch. 6).
11 “An important fact about the aff ordances of the environment is that they are in a sense 
objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which are oft en supposed to be 
subjective, phenomenal and mental. But, actually, an aff ordance is neither an objective property 
nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An aff ordance cuts across the dichotomy of 
subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy” (Gibson 1979: 129). 
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6.3. Connections to umwelt
As evidenced by the widespread use of the term in many disciplines, the power 
in Gibson’s concept resides precisely in its broad generality, not its narrow 
applicability within visual psychology.12 As testament to this, many scholars 
have suggested that more heuristic value can be returned to Gibson’s concept by 
embedding it within Jakob von Uexkü ll’s theory of umwelt.13 
Tim Ingold (2009; also 2000) in particular has closely compared the relation-
ships between the two concepts. Despite Gibson having set out to develop an 
eco logical conception that always maintains complete complementarity of 
observer and environment,14 he eventually contradicted himself by ultimately 
placing affordances firmly on the side of the environment, even making in-
compatible statements like “the environment does not depend on the organism 
for its existence” (Gibson 1979: 8, 129). Ingold (2009: 144) concludes by affirming 
how the philosophical conviction behind statements such as these are ultimately 
incompatible with the active functional meaning-seeking system referred to 
through Jakob von Uexkü ll’s umwelt concept:
For whereas Gibsonian affordances are supposed to exist as the inherent potentials 
of environmental objects, regardless of whether they are attended to or put to use 
by any organism, von Uexküll maintained that what he called the ‘quality’ (Ton) 
of a thing, by virtue of which it has significance for a particular creature, is not 
intrinsic to the thing itself but is acquired by virtue of its having been drawn into 
that creature’s activity (Uexkü ll 1982: 27–29). (Ingold 2011: 79)
Ingold goes on to draw upon classic examples from umwelt theory, which are also 
interrelated with our re-definition of semiotic scaffolding in this article: a stone 
in a river can function as a habitat for a crab, a hard surface for breaking shells for 
gulls, and a stepping-stone for a bridge for a human: 
In Gibson’s terms [...] [these] are all properties of the stone that are available to be 
taken up. For von Uexküll, by contrast, they are qualities that are bestowed upon 
12 As Dotov et al. (2012) point out, a notable infl uence of Gibson’s concept came directly and 
indirectly from the American pragmatist tradition, which Gibson was a part of through his 
adviser Edwin Holt who himself was a student of William James. For more about the infl uence 
of pragmatist philosophy on ecological psychology in general, see Heft  2001.
13 See for example: Cunningham 1988, 1998; Ingold 2009; Dotov et al. 2012. Uexkü ll even had 
his own notion of aff ordances within his approach to ethology, in his concept of ‘functional 
tone’ (funktionale Tönung).
14 Th e “subjective world” (Gibson 1979: 129) perspective that Gibson recognizes as being 
present in the work of certain biologists, without specifi cally mentioning or citing Uexkü ll.
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the stone by the need of the creature in question and in the very act of attending 
to it [...]. Thus, far from fitting into a given corner of the world (a niche), it is the 
animal that fits the world to itself by ascribing functional qualities to the things it 
encounters [affordances] and thereby integrating them into a coherent system of 
its own. (Ingold 2009: 144–145)
Ingold concludes that the concept of affordances is enriched when embedded 
within this corollary concept of umwelt, in place of more static designations such 
as environment and niche; helping to maintain the holism that Gibson sought but 
was ultimately unable to fully articulate.
When in recent work Ingold preferred the concept of affordances to the 
concept of umwelt, he used an argument that affordances (as different from 
umwelt) provide unmediated direct knowledge (Ingold 2019). This is obviously 
due to a narrower concept of mediation used by Ingold; according to biosemiotic 
accounts, any perception includes mediation.15 
Donald Cunningham (1988; 1998) has proposed the affordances–umwelt 
coupling for educational psychology and developing semiotic theories of learning. 
Despite occasional forays into the term’s applicability within semiotic studies (cf. 
Windsor 2004), ‘affordances’ has been relatively underexplored in general semiotic 
discourse16  – at least compared to the extensive use of the term within social 
semiotic and other applied forms of semiotics. 
As noted by Niveleau (2006), affordance stems from the concept and philo-
sophy of gestalt and forgetting this connection has impoverished the concept of 
affordance. 
6.4. In technology, social semiotics, music
As alluded to, the concept of ‘affordances’ has been widely adopted within 
technology studies and design-oriented fields (e.g. Faraj, Azad 2012; Majchrzak 
et al. 2013; Treem, Leonardi 2013). It is important to note that in large part the 
concept entered these discourses through Donald A. Norman’s repurposing of the 
term in his design classic The Psychology of Everyday Things (1988). In contrast 
to Gibson’s earlier formulation that stressed non-dualistic complementarity of 
subject-object relations, Norman’s notion is entirely (and deliberately) dependent 
15 Even signal transduction requires mediation (Bruni 2008). For instance, the mediating 
element is described by Barbieri as code-maker.
16 Winfried Nöth (2010) has compiled a valuable and thorough literature review of educational 
semiotics, or edusemiotics as it is sometimes referred to. Gibson’s concept of aff ordances and 
its use in semiotic discourses is briefl y discussed in a section on ecological semiotics, a fi eld 
Nöth himself has been an important pioneer of.
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upon the competence and capability of the actor.17 Unlike much subsequent research 
in technology and even multimodality studies, Norman fully acknowledges this 
distinction between his concept of affordance and that of Gibson’s.18
As McGrenere and Ho note, the main difference between the two conceptions 
is that for Gibson, affordances are “action possibilities in the environment in 
relation to the action capabilities of an actor” and for Norman, they are “perceived 
properties that may not actually exist” (McGrenere, Ho 2000: 181). As for Gibson, 
for Norman, too, the ontological status is ultimately irrelevant, but now the notion 
has been inverted, in part. Notably, it is the interpretation and linage of the term 
within design that seems to have informed Kress and the New London Group’s 
concept of ‘modal affordance’ as “what it is possible to express and represent easily 
(within a given cultural mode)” (Jewitt 2008: 247).19
Interestingly, the concept has also significantly entered music-related discipli-
nes (music cognition and perception studies, music education studies), from other 
related educational discourses (e.g. López Cano 2006; Menin, Schiavio 2012). 
Some recent music-related research that has significantly developed the concept 
of affordances has turned to biosemiotic theory and explanations. This includes a 
neo-Peircean ‘biosemiotic’ reading of how music emerged in the human species, 
from evolutionary musicologist Gary Tomlinson (2015; cf. Schyff, Schiavio 2017), 
and a biosemiotic account of musical perception and cognition that places both 
umwelt and affordances in a central role, in the work of Reybrouck (2012, 2015). 
17 “[...] the term aff ordance refers to the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily 
those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used. [...] 
Aff ordances provide strong clues to the operations of things. Plates are for pushing. Knobs 
are for turning. Slots are for inserting things into. Balls are for throwing or bouncing. When 
aff ordances are taken advantage of, the user knows what to do just by looking: no picture, label, 
or instruction needed” (Norman 1988: 9).
18 As an important footnote puts it: “Th e notion of aff ordance and the insights it provides 
originated with J. J. Gibson, a psychologist interested in how people see the world. I believe that 
aff ordances result from the mental interpretation of things, based on our past knowledge and 
experience applied to our perception of the things about us. My view is somewhat in confl ict 
with the views of many Gibsonian psychologists, but this internal debate within modern 
psychology is of little relevance here” (Norman 1988: 219).
19 Th e term had made its way into educational discourse long before Kress and his colleagues 
took it up (largely in the fi elds of educational psychology, science and engineering education, 
music education). Two points should be noted: fi rst, that usage of the term in educational 
discourses picked up as the 1990s progressed, although it had been used as early as 1984, and 
second, the majority of the articles explore the concept from within a “designs for learning” 
perspective. 
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6.5. Extending affordances into general semiotics
The issue of how far we may comfortably extend this notion of affordances into 
the cultural and social realms is of central importance for our re-definition within 
a general (bio)semiotic framework. This issue has been the subject of vociferous 
and frequent debate in the Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, particularly 
through the 1980s and 1990s. Ginsburg (1990) offers an extensive review of this 
scholarly conversation, and emphasizes that the diversity of often contradictory 
views on affordances is in large part the result of Gibson’s own “conceptual 
temerity” around how to best deal with cultural or social perception. This was 
no doubt due to Gibson’s own convictions that direct perception, unmediated by 
language, or any sort of representational content is the “simplest and best kind 
of knowing” (Gibson 1979: 263). As Noble (1981, 1991) and Heft (1989, 1990, 
2001) do well to note, ultimately this conviction results in Gibson having: (1) 
conceptualized affordances as almost solely environmental properties, and (2) 
undermined the role played by the organism’s (potential) actions in detecting and 
perceiving affordances (in brief, the organism’s freedom). 
This debate directs us to take a semiotic view on affordances, in which, as 
Sanders (1997: 108, emphasis added) states, “affordances are opportunities for action 
in the environment of an organism, the opportunities in question include everything 
the organism can do, and the environment includes the entire realm of potential 
activity for that organism [...]”. Luke Windsor, a musicologist, extended this debate 
into general semiotics by emphasizing that when considering affordances, no 
distinction between direct and indirect perception is required: “the perception of a 
semiotic affordance is just as direct as the perception of an affordance of any event 
or object, given that one accepts that cultural aspects of the environment provide 
us with affordances at all” (Windsor 2004: 189). He explains how Peirce’s triadic 
sign model allows for the conceptualization of affordance as a changing mediation, 
between (a) stimulus information, (b) unfolding events in the environment, and (c) 
action-possibilities for the actor. Windsor (2004: 193) explains that “the organism 
and environment are brought into a meaningful relationship by perceiving and 
acting upon affordances. However, affordances are a description of the relationship 
between organism and environment, not the means by which organism and 
environment become coupled.” This suggests that affordances are potential (as yet, 
unactualized) action-possibilities; and thus, ultimately sign-relations, whose meaning 
emerges in reference to an evolving function (a means)20 and in use (CP 5.569).
20 “Th e action of the organism “interprets” this causal relationship to create the possibility 
of meaning through a “third”. Stimulus information, events and actions are the necessary 
components for describing aff ordances, and no pair of these terms provides a suffi  cient 
explanation of perception” (Windsor 2004: 194).
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6.6. Redefinition
As for our redefinition within a general semiotic theory of knowing, we place 
affordances in close connection to the semiotic construal of learning: we propose 
defining affordances as potential semiotic resources that an organism enacts 
(detects, reads, uses, engages) to channel learning-as-choice in its environment. 
Like Gibson (1966: 285), Windsor emphasized that “learning is vital to the 
perception of affordances” (Windsor 2004: 189). We follow Windsor, but also 
further highlight that the organism’s ability to make use of these resources in 
meaningful ways is dependent upon its species-specific embodied competences.
Further, to account fully for the implications of this definition, we emphasize 
that in invoking and enacting these affordances, organisms make use of and enact 
scaffolding structures and processes. These scaffolding processes direct and focus 
decision-making, expressed through learning.
7. Scaffolding
7.1. Scaffolding in educational studies
The concept of scaffolding stems from the socio-constructivism of Lev Vygotsky – 
who introduced the idea but did not himself use the term (see Vygotsky 1986 
[1934]).21 The concept was first significantly developed by Jerome Bruner and his 
colleagues in Wood, Bruner, Ross 1976 to help explain how adults interact with 
children in joint problem-solving activities. Put very generally, scaffolding is used 
as a conceptual metaphor in the learning sciences – explaining a developmental 
and pedagogical process or strategy by which temporary support (in a broad 
sense) is given to learners to aid them through tasks and activities they might not 
otherwise be able to complete or undergo independently (Pol, Volman, Beishuizen 
2010: 271–272). Cazden (1979) early on connected the concept with Vygotsky’s 
zone of proximal development (ZPD). The ZPD refers to a liminal developmental 
space; between what a learner can do on her own and what she cannot yet do. 
As described by Vygotsky: “[…] the distance between the actual developmental 
level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential 
development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or 
in collaboration with more capable peers” (Vygotsky 1978: 86; see also Olteanu, 
Campbell 2018: 253–254). 
21 Although, Vygotsky and Luria (1930: 202) occasionally used the scaff olding metaphor (see 
Veer, Valsiner 1991: 226). For the early history of the scaff olding metaphor see Shvarts, Bakker 
(2019).
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Pol, Volman and Beishuizen (2010) explain in their review of “Scaffolding in 
teacher-student interaction”, that despite the term being well used in the learning 
sciences, there remains no common consensus on its definition. Many authors 
have argued that “the concept of scaffolding has been applied too broadly in 
educational and psychological research” (Pol, Volman and Beishuizen 2010: 272) 
to the extent that it “has become unclear in its significance” (Pea 2004: 423).22
7.2. Interdisciplinary scope and use in biosemiotics
The term ‘scaffolding’ has recently received significant transdisciplinary attention.23
Notably, the concept has been developed and used within biosemiotic research 
within the last 15 or so years: see, in particular, Hoffmeyer 2007, 2014a, 2014b, 
2015, Kull 2012, 2014, 2015, and Fernández 2015a, 2015b. 
In these studies, it seems to be precisely the term’s broad generality that is 
valued; providing explanatory power in understanding biological and semiotic 
evolution non-deterministically. Semiotic scaffolding is closely linked with a 
concept of learning, describing how organisms continually seek and extract 
meanings through their interactions within their umwelt. 
The term has become a central theme within Jesper Hoffmeyer’s post 2005-work 
(noted in Kull 2015: 224). The following description from Hoffmeyer highlights 
the broad scope of the concept for biosemiotics, and its connections to semiotic 
conceptions of embodiment: “The network of semiotic interactions by which 
individual cells, organisms, populations, or ecological units are controlling their 
activities can thus be seen as scaffolding devices assuring that an organism’s activities 
become tuned to that organism’s needs” (Hoffmeyer 2007: 154). From Hoffmeyer’s 
research on scaffolding two main points become clear: “(1) scaffolding in its exact 
sense is always a semiotic scaffolding, and (2) semiotic scaffolding is at work in all 
levels of semiosis, from the origin of life forward” (Kull 2015: 224). 
22 At its most general, scaff olding seems to be used as a metaphor for any kind of instructional 
support (Puntambekar, Hübscher 2005) and many authors have critiqued its utility: see Butler 
1998; Donahue, Lopez-Reyna 1998; Scruggs, Mastropieri 1998, and the discussion in Pol, 
Volman, Beishuizen 2010: 274–276. For defenses of the scaff olding metaphor, see the work of 
Stone (1993, 1998a, 1998b). 
23 Within the philosophy of science, to describe the growth and construction of scientifi c 
theories and knowledge and the process of cultural evolution (Wimsatt, Griesemer 2007; 
Wimsatt 2014); a notion of language as scaff olding within embodied cognition discourses 
(Clark 2008). Th e term has also received focus from recent research in theoretical biology 
(see Caporael, Griesemer, Wimsatt 2014). See also the connection to models as scaff olds of 
understanding in Shank et al. 2014.
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7.3. Scaffolding defined through learning
What makes scaffolding properly semiotic must have to do, ultimately, with the 
kind of learning evoked.24 As explained by Kull (2015; 2018) – but also Campbell 
(2017, 2018)  – semiotic learning is different from computational learning, 
for “semiotic learning requires a choice between options” (Kull 2015: 225). It 
requires decision-making and “decision making is not computing, it is choice” 
(Kull 2015: 226). Choice, as meant here, is phenomenological: decisions are 
situated, taken by organisms in timespace. Problems that require solving are not 
laboratory simulations or the playing-out of algorithms. They are real events, with 
existential consequences for sentient beings, unfolding in organisms’ umwelten. 
Semiotic learning through choice requires two elements: (1) a situation of logical 
incompatibility, in which a problem-situation emerges for the organism, and 
(2) a phenomenal present (or species-specific nowness), “a subjective duration 
felt as one moment so that the options or choices, which computationally taken 
are always sequential, are seen simultaneously” (Pikkarainen 2018: 444). This 
choice may prove in the future to be adaptive, in the sense that it may come to 
make the organism’s needs more aligned with its actions in the environment. 
Through such processes the organism sets new scaffoldings (semiotic, but with 
“real” environmental effects) to channel knowing in the environment. These 
scaffolding structures would not be there if the “correct” decision was taken to 
begin with (simply encoded in the environment, or in the organism’s brain and 
body structure, as exemplified in our above discussion on affordances). This 
highlights the importance of the learning process itself, suggesting that in life, 
there are no shortcuts to knowledge – knowledge and knowing are something that 
must grow with and within the organism. While there are no shortcuts, in a sense, 
neither are there detours: continuous learning-through-time unavoidably evokes 
learning, which is how we interpret Peirce’s daring statement that, while denying 
the old empiricist tabula rasa doctrine, “experience is our only teacher” (CP 5.50).
Understanding learning and living as co-extensive with meaning-making means 
that knowledge, and the study of it, takes on an existential dimension. To live is to 
learn (or know) about the world through the scaffoldings of previous experiences and 
previous generations (at biological, cultural and personal levels). Such scaffolding 
is enacted according to an organism’s species-specific competences and to how these 
function adaptively within a historically dynamic environment.
24 Kull (2014: 118) observes how diff erent mechanisms of learning result in the formation 
of diff erent types of sign relations: “(a) relation of recognition – iconic signs; (b) relation of 
association – indexical signs; (c) relation of imitation – emonic signs; (d) relation of convention – 
symbolic signs”.
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To recap: through evolving modes of semiotic engagement (Stables 2006), 
particular challenges (or problem-situations) arise for an organism; and through 
these, also new opportunities and affordances. Some of these problems/opportu-
nities are reoccurring and thus generalizable; others are more indeterminate and 
novel. These problems require responses, and through a process of learning-over-
time organisms create and enact varying types of “scaffolding” to channel learning 
adaptively: “Due to scaffolding, the choice becomes directed” (Kull 2015: 226). 
Learning requires both some degree of incompatibility (code plurality), as well 
as constraints and direction (that is, scaffolding). As noted by Kull (2015: 227): 
“Semiotic scaffolding provides direction, while code plurality provides incompa-
tibility for choice. The reason why scaffolding provides direction is because it is built 
of links that are earlier products of choice, of the decisions made”. This is to say that 
for ‘learning’ to be learning at all, it cannot be singular and occasional. Learning 
requires memory (Kull 2018: 458; Campbell 2019: 301–304), a trace, so that a related 
problem can be solved in a less unpredictable way in the future:
[...] what we call scaffolding is the means that supports decision making and 
learning. It is that which, in the situation of indeterminacy, provides certain 
preferences in making decisions. Also, under scaffolding we mean the kind of 
structures that carry traces of some earlier like, that has been built by life, by 
semiosis. (Kull 2015: 229, emphasis added).25
This allows for the explanation that “what appears as adaptation, has gone through 
this kind of stage of problem-solving” (Kull 2015: 225), and thus scaffolding refers 
to an important but, arguably, neglected aspect of the evolutionary process.26
25 Th is points to a diff erence with educational studies. Unlike its characterization, for 
example, in Pol, Volman, Beishuizen 2010: 277, who insist that scaff olding is a combination 
of certain scaff olding means with certain scaff olding intentions, in biosemiotics, by focusing 
on the “means” of scaff olding, we can better understand the structural aspects of this general 
process, while recognizing that, in a certain sense, the intentional aspects of scaff olding at the 
biological level are provided by the teleological aspects of the life process itself.
26 Fernández (2015a: 91–92, emphasis added) says, that biosemiotics itself is an attempt 
“to organize and reconceptualize our knowledge of living systems, their functions, origins 
and evolution, in terms of the crucial role played by semiotic causation and semiotic 
scaff olding in practically every aspect of their internal dynamics (i.e., energy and nutrients 
acquisition, metabolism, reproduction, etc.) as well as in their complex energetic and 
semiotic interchanges with their surroundings”. 
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7.4. Redefinition and integration with other general semiotic concepts
The notion of semiotic competence that we present in this article is also closely 
related and, more precisely, explicative to our definition of scaffolding. Semiotic 
competence (see above) here consists in the organism’s ability to activate semiotic 
resources in the form of affordances (see Kull 2018: 459; Olteanu, Stables 2018: 
423, 429). This ultimately manifests itself as an anticipatory response; by which a 
relationship to a ‘possible future state’ reconfigures the organism’s current state of 
being (Campbell 2017; 2018; Nadin 2017; Hoffmeyer 2007: 149). This anticipatory 
competence is always “based on the constraints established or modified in learning” 
(Kull 2018: 45). Thus, affordances as potential resources are themselves “a result of 
earlier traces and choices that reappear during the recognition event” (Kull 2018: 
45). Through a recursive process of discovering sign relations in the environment 
and gradually canalizing these action-habits into scaffolding, organisms achieve new 
semiotic competences or, more directly, they learn: “[Scaffolding] is the frame for the 
formation of future habits” (Kull 2015: 232). 
As emphasized in both educational and semiotic studies (see Wood, Bruner, 
Ross 1976: 98; Bernstein 1967; Kull 2014: 116), scaffolding imposes and enacts 
constraints that – like the recursive process of semiosis itself – simultaneously 
narrow interpretative possibilities while revealing new ones (in the form of 
affordances). Hoffmeyer (2015: 251–252), explained that through such lens we 
can think of cultural institutions as scaffolding structures, that channel learning 
in a particular way: “Each new jump to higher level semiotic scaffolding systems 
tends to homogenize cultural performances at the lower level while opening up 
new agendas of expressivity at the higher level”.27
These tendencies are prevalent in what is commonly called learning, which can 
be said to proceed through a process of (1) singularization, closing and narrowing 
meaning-possibilities, and (2) diversification, which introduces new distinctions 
and thus new codes and code incompatibility (Kull 2014: 117). 
When scaffolding is able to channel effectively learning in an umwelt, new 
habits and also new codes arise. At this stage, it is important to distinguish 
between the concepts of scaffolding and code. What distinguishes codes from 
scaffolding, is their functionality; code refers to a binary sign-relation, defined 
through correspondence, “whereas scaffolding always has a supporting task or 
function” (Kull 2015: 230). We can clarify each in relation to the another: “[...] 
27 We see these principles at work in how representational systems (notation, languages) both 
close and open communicative possibilities. See, for example, the analysis of the eff ects that 
musical notation and symbolic cognition have on music perception and learning in Reybrouck 
2015.
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semiosis is a learning process that produces scaffolding that forms habits that results 
in codes” (Kull 2014: 116, emphasis added). The process of habituation refers 
primarily to transformations at the agent level – and this is perhaps how we may 
distinguish habit from scaffolding, which refers more specifically to a continuing 
process that necessarily involves at least several agents and a supporting (i.e. 
collaborative and in a sense pedagogical) function. 
As regards scaffolding, Hoffmeyer (2010: 196) postulated that “one of the 
few general trends that can be ascribed to organic evolution is the tendency 
towards the production of species exhibiting more and more semiotic competence 
or freedom in the sense of locally meaningful interpretants”. Such an increase in 
semiotic freedom can be described as the growth in the logical richness of decision-
making.
Semiotic freedom refers here to the complexity of choice an organism has for 
channeling learning in a way that sustains meaningful relationships within its 
umwelt (see also Stjernfelt 2006: 23). This is not necessarily or simply an increase 
in choice, but rather growth of meaning. As Peirce posited, “And what is growth? 
Not mere increase!” (CP 1.174).28 
Of course, the diversity of semiotic resources at an organism’s disposal is 
related to the faculty of re-cognition, and thus the competency in interpreting a 
depth of meaning, so that the same form or event29 can be variously interpreted – 
for example, one may identify the same sign as quality (icon), as referent (index), 
as convention (symbol). However, such variability is not necessarily by default 
evolutionary advantageous for organisms with very different bodily structures 
(such as plant and fungi life). Divergent umwelten require divergent solutions; to 
learn is to find solutions that work locally and immediately.
Conclusion
A semiotic account on learning (and its various descriptive elements and concepts: 
competence, resource, affordance, scaffolding) shows the need for a broader eco-
logical perspective, where the eco-system itself is recognized as central to how 
the organism forms meaning within its umwelt. As Nöth shows, the biosemiotic 
28 For more details see Hoff meyer 2015: 251. Campbell (2018: 563) explains this notion of 
semiotic freedom through reference to the etymological origins of the English word learning 
in ‘leornian’, which has base roots in ‘to follow or fi nd the track’, saying: “A growth in semiotic 
freedom is inevitably expressed in the capacity of an organism to model its environment in its 
own species-specifi c manner; to learn (to “fi nd the track”) within its umwelt”.
29 See Stjernfelt’s (2006: 23–24, 33–34) concept of ‘neutral object’.
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notion of umwelt implies that organisms model their environments by an un inter -
rupted, subjective hermeneutic circle (Nöth 1998: 339). We identify this herme-
neutic circle with the interpretive framework, understood as evolving, which 
according to Stables both enables and constrains knowledge. More pre cisely, the 
hermeneutic circle enables knowledge by restricting it, by framing it within what 
Peirce, inspired by Augustus de Morgan (1840), termed the “universe of discourse” 
(CP 2.517). This is what is ultimately described through semiotic scaffolding: 
“[…] organisms would hardly be able to make reasonable decisions without their 
bodies together with their ecosystems embedding earlier experience helping 
them to direct their future choices” (Kull 2015: 232). Scaffolding is thus central in 
contributing to an account of development and learning that puts these qualitative 
features (such as support, environment-organism interaction, and collaborative 
learning) into focus: a reminder that learning is enacted from within the unfurling 
event of semiosis (Campbell 2018).
Like the concept of affordances, scaffolding also refers to a mediation. It is in 
this sense, that we can say that “semiotic scaffolding is what makes history matter 
to an organism (or a cultural system)” (Hoffmeyer 2015: 154). This basic emphasis 
on complementarity is highly compatible with Peirce’s conviction that signs play a 
central role in what is now called cognition, to the extent that “externalized signs are 
not mere supportive devices, instead, they undertake tasks which simply could not 
be performed by the brain (or body) alone” (Peirce as paraphrased in Hoffmeyer 
2015: 252; cf. CP 7.364). This synthetizes this article’s proposal for a general semiotic 
account of knowing, that redefines psychological and cognitive conceptions without 
reducing them to mentalistic or computational explanations.30 
Defining learning as the growth or modification of sign relations eschews 
reductively cognitivist or computational accounts. 
For a semiotic theory of knowing, what is important is what things mean for 
the organism. Because this meaning grows over time, it must be accounted for 
through criteria of semiotic fitting (Kull 2020). Every choice is an opening and 
a closure, and to know is to occupy a place within a vast network of semiotic 
entanglements within an environment and ecosystem. This emphasises both the 
ecological and phenomenological dimensions of a semiotic theory of knowledge: 
“Knowledge acquisition is based on new relations being established by the 
learning system itself ” (Kull 2015: 232).
30 Olteanu and Stables (2018: 421) explain: “[...] from its beginning, biosemiotics was defi ned 
by Sebeok [e.g. 1991, 2001] [...] as a modelling theory and, while useful for cognitive theories as 
well, it does not impose any particular assumption about cognition. Th us, from this perspective, 
a theory of learning does not necessarily imply a discussion on cognition. An educational 
theory and system can conceive learning in terms of signifi cation only”. 
374 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
In brief, our argument is that the semiotic toolbox can be greatly expanded 
by linking concepts that describe cognitive processes to the concept of semiosis 
via their updated definitions, because cognitive processes are naturally semiosic. 
Semiosis as the basic meaning-making process grounds learning and knowing. 
Extending the list of semiotic concepts is part of a larger programme in the 
development of semiotic theory.31
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Обучение и знание как семиозис: расширение концептуального 
аппарата семиотики
Если все знания рождаются в процессе семиозиса, то в семиотический инструментарий 
следует добавить дополнительные понятия. Вместе с тем, семиотические понятия 
должны быть определены через другие семиотические понятия. Мы рассматриваем 
возможность определения понятий когнитивных процессов и явлений с помощью 
семиотических терминов. В частности, мы концентрируемся на понятиях, имеющих 
отношение к теории познания, таких как обучение, знание, доступность (affordance), 
подпорка (scaffolding), ресурсы, компетенция, память и некоторые другие. Даем их 
предварительные определения с семиотической точки зрения, что позволяет также 
показать их взаимо связанность. Переосмысление этих терминов помогает избежать 
как физикализма, так и психологизма, демонстрируя эпистемологические характе-
ристики взаимоотношения организмов и среды через семиотическое понимание 
при способленности. Также мы вкратце обсудим значение наших введенных заново 
определений в качестве вклада в семиотическую теорию познания, которая имеет 
отношение как к гуманитарным наукам, так и к наукам о жизни, не забывая при этом об 
их значимости для образования и психологии, а также для социальных семиотических 
исследований и исследований в области мультимодальности. 
Õppimine ja teadmine kui semioos: semiootika mõistestiku laiendamine
Kui kogu teadmine pärineb semioosist, siis tuleb semiootika seniste vahendite hulka lisada roh-
kem mõisteid. Semiootika mõisteteks on need, mis on defineeritud teiste semiootika mõistete 
kaudu. Näe me võimalust laiendada semiootika mõistestikku sel teel, et defineerida tajuprotsessi 
mõisted ja nähtused semiootiliste mõistete kaudu. Võtame selleks käsile teadmis teooriaga seo-
tud mõisted nagu õppimine, teadmine, võimaldus (affordance), toestus (scaffolding), vahendid, 
pädevus, mälu ja mõned teised. Esitame nende mõistete definitsioonide esialgsed semiootika-
kaudsed sõnastused, sellega ühtaegu neid ka omavahel seostades. Nende mõistete niisugune 
ümberdefineerimine aitab vältida nii füsikalismi kui psühhologismi, tuues esile organismide 
keskkonnasuhete epistemoloogilise tahu semiootilise sobitumise tähenduses. Arutledes iga 
mõiste ümberdefineerimise juures nende osa üle semiootilises teadmisteoorias (millel on roll 
nii humanitaarteaduste kui eluteaduste jaoks), toome esile ka rakendatavuse haridus teaduses 
ja psühholoogias, samuti sotsiosemiootikas ja multimodaalsuse uuringutes.
